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One of the most serious problems that a central bank in an emerging
market economy can face is the sudden reversal of capital inflows (or
sudden stops). Hoarding international reserves can be used to smooth
the impact of such reversals (see, for example, Lee, 2004), but these
reserves are seldom sufficient and always expensive to hold.
In Caballero and Panageas (2005), we derive and estimate a
quantitative model to assess the (noncontingent) reserve management
strategy typically followed by central banks. We conclude that this
strategy is clearly inferior to one in which portfolios include assets
that are correlated with sudden stops. As an illustration, we show
that holding contracts on the Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 100 implied
volatility index (VIX) can yield a significant reduction in the average
cost of sudden stops.
This result should not be surprising to anyone who follows the
practices of hedge funds and other leading investors. Institutional
investors seldom immobilize large amounts of cash to insure against
jumps in volatility and risk-aversion—except in the case of extremely
frequent events, which sudden stops are not. The use of derivatives
and the creation of the VIX are designed precisely to satisfy hedging
needs. Why should central banks, which are the quintessential public
risk management institutions, not adopt best practices for risk
management?
In this paper we present a simple model designed to isolate the
portfolio dimension of the reserves management problem. We estimate
the key parameters of the model from the joint behavior of sudden stops
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and the VIX, which we then use to generate optimal portfolios. We
show that in an ideal setting, in which countries and investors can
identify the jumps in the VIX and in which there exist call options on
the VIX, an average emerging market economy may expect to face a
sudden stop with up to 40 percent more reserves than when these options
are not included in the central bank’s portfolio.
The main reason behind this important gain is the close relation
we identify between jumps in the VIX and sudden stops. We estimate
that the probability of a sudden stop conditional on a jump in the VIX
is about four times the probability of a sudden stop in the absence of a
jump. Another dimension of the same finding, which speaks directly
of the hedging virtues of the VIX, is that the probability of a jump in
the VIX is slightly above 30 percent when there is no sudden stop in
emerging markets and over 70 percent when a sudden stop takes
place in that year.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents a simple static
portfolio model for a central bank concerned with sudden stops. Section
2 then solves the model under various assumptions on hedging
opportunities. Section 3 discusses implementation issues. Section 4
quantifies the model, first illustrating the behavior of the VIX and its
coincidence with sudden stops in emerging markets (represented by
nine economies: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia,
Mexico, Thailand, and Turkey). It then estimates the different
parameters of the model and reports the optimal portfolios for a range
of relevant parameters. Section 5 documents the impact of the different
hedging strategies on the availability of reserves during sudden stops,
and section 6 concludes.
1. BASIC FRAMEWORK
We analyze the investment decisions of a central bank that seeks
to minimize the real costs of a sudden stop of capital inflows. Our
goal is to provide a simple model to isolate the portfolio problem
associated with such an objective. We refer the reader to Caballero
and Panageas (2005) for a dynamic framework that discusses the
optimal path of reserves and the microeconomic frictions behind
sudden stops. Here we simply take from that paper that when a
sudden stop occurs, the country’s ability to use its wealth for current
consumption is significantly curtailed. The immediate implication
of such a constraint is a sharp rise in the marginal value of an extra
unit of reserves.
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There are two dates in the model: date 0, when portfolio decisions
are made, and date 1, when asset returns realize and a sudden stop
may take place. We assume that a central bank’s objective has the
following form:
, (1)
where R1 denotes total reserves at date 1. K≥0 is a target level of
reserves at date 1, which we take to be constant throughout; it captures
reasons for holding reserves other than the (short-run) fear of sudden
stops we emphasize. Deviations from this target are costly: a shortfall
from the target implies that the central bank’s objectives cannot be
adequately met. Similarly, an excess level of reserves implies
accumulation costs (which, among other things, capture the difference
between the borrowing and the lending rate and the slope of the yield
curve). The term 1(SS)Z is composed of two terms: an indicator
function, 1(SS), that becomes 1 during a sudden stop (SS) and is 0
otherwise, and a constant, Z > 0, that controls the need for funds
during the sudden stop. This constant captures the shift in the
marginal utility of wealth that occurs once a sudden stop takes place.
Hence, by construction of the optimization problem, a central bank
desires to transfer reserves to sudden stop states. The program of
equation (1) is to be solved subject to
RP B 00 0 =+ π  and (2)
RB P 11 1 =+ π ,
where R1 is the initial level of reserves, π is the amount of risky securities
held by the central bank, P0 is the price of such securities, and P1 is the
(stochastic) payoff of these assets at t = 1. B0 is the amount of
noncontingent bonds held by the central bank, whose interest rate we
fix at 0 for simplicity, so that B1 = B0 and
RR P P 10 1 0 =+ − ( ) π .
Replacing this expression in equation (1) and computing the first-
order conditions with respect to R0 and π yields
RK Z 0 =+() Pr SS  and  (3)
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where we have removed Merton’s portfolio term by assuming fair risk-
neutral pricing of the risky asset (an assumption we maintain
throughout):
EP P 10 () = .
We highlight three observations about this simple setup at this
stage. First, the central bank has an aversion to overaccumulating
reserves. If Z = 0 and K = 0, then R0 = 0. Under these circumstances,
the central bank achieves the maximum of the objective. Our main
concern in this paper is with those reserves associated with the
possibility of a costly sudden stop, Z > 0.
Second, the level of reserves invested at date 0, R0, is independent of
the portfolio, π, or the properties of the risky asset. This is due to the so-
called certainty-equivalence property of the quadratic model. With more
general preferences that exhibit a prudence motive, such as a constant
relative risk aversion (CRRA), an increase in hedging (π) reduces the
total amount of reserves held (see Caballero and Panageas, 2005).
Third, and most importantly, risky assets are not held if P1 is
uncorrelated with the sudden stop, 1{SS}. Risky assets are only held to
the extent that they succeed in creating attractive payoffs during sudden
stops, that is, as long as1
EPS S EPS S 11 10 = () >= () .
2. FROM CONVENTIONAL RESERVES TO HEDGES
We now characterize the solution for three cases of special interest.
The first—our base-case model—assumes away hedging completely,
which is not far from what central banks do in practice. The second
case is an Arrow-Debreu setup in which contracts can be written
contingent on the sudden stop. It captures the opposite extreme. The
third is an intermediate case that allows for proxy hedging through
contracts that are correlated, but not perfectly, with sudden stops.
1. We have renormalized all potential assets to be held in positive amounts.
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2.1 No Hedging
We set  π = 0 in the base-case model and drop the optimization with
respect to π. Then,
BRK S S Z 00 == + () Pr .  (5)
As one might expect, the possibility of a sudden stop induces the
country to hold reserves beyond the target level, K. This is probably
one the main reasons why Chile, for example, holds four to five times
the reserves of Australia or Canada.
2.2 Hedging with Arrow-Debreu Securities












In this case our assumption of fair-pricing implies that
PS S 0 = () Pr .
It follows from equation (4) and the fact that in this case
cov , var var 11 11 SS SS () ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦ = () ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦ = () PP
that
π=Z . (6)
When we replace this expression in equations (2) and (3), we obtain
BK S S Z K 0 =+()− () = Pr π .
With perfect Arrow-Debreu securities (and fair pricing), the central
bank will completely hedge away the sudden stop risk, so that
RZ B K 10 1 − ()== SS .
Now let us express the portfolio of Arrow-Debreu securities as a
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In the interesting special case of K = 0 (corresponding to the case in
which the country finds it optimal to hold no reserves in the absence of
sudden stops), we have
φ=1 .
That is, all resources are invested in Arrow-Debreu securities.
2.3 The Intermediate Case
In reality, one observes neither Arrow-Debreu securities nor
contracts written contingent on the sudden stop (at least in an amount
sufficient to insulate the country from it). There are good reasons for
that: in practice, the sudden stop itself is unlikely to be fully contractible,
since its occurrence may depend on a country’s actions and private
information. The practical relevance of the simple model proposed above
thus rests critically on the existence of assets and trading strategies
that could function as good substitutes for the idealized assets envisaged
above. We develop a simple extension to the Arrow-Debreu world above
by introducing an asset that pays 1 when an event that we call J happens
(corresponding, for example, to a discrete drop in some asset price). We
introduce the notation
ψ
h J == = () Pr SS 1 1 ,
ψ
l J == = () Pr SS 1 0 ,
η= = () Pr J 1 , and
ψη ψ η ψ
lh l == () =+ − () Pr SS 1 1 ,
and we assume that
01 ≤≤≤ ψψ
lh.
In this case, it is suboptimal for the country to invest all of its assets in
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1  and  (7)
BK Z 0 =+ − ψπ η .
These formulas encompass those obtained previously. If ψh = ψl,
then the two indicators are independent and thus π = 0. However, as
ψh → 1 and ψl → 0, then ψ → η and the country insures the sudden
stop completely. Short of that, the central bank finds it optimal to hedge
sudden stops partly with noncontingent reserves: if ψh < 1, the risky
asset may not deliver during a sudden stop. And if ψh < 1 ψl > 0, the
country pays for protection it does not need from the risky asset.2
As a percentage of total reserves, the risky asset portfolio represents
φ
π η








This expression has a natural interpretation. Let x ∈ [0, 1] represent









Given quadratic utility, this number is independent of the hedging
instruments (the properties of J do not influence this number). Then




ψψ =− ( ) x
hl
.  (8)
That is, the portfolio is composed of three terms. The first is the fraction
of reserves used for the prevention of sudden stops, x.3 The second
2. With quadratic utility it suffices that ψl = 0 and ψh > 0 for the country to
invest its entire portfolio in the risky asset (for K = 0). The proximity of ψh to one
only determines how much hedging is achieved by this strategy.
3. Our sense of prevention is different from that in García and Soto (in this
volume), where a stock of reserves is needed to prevent runs on the country.
Their concept is subsumed in our fixed K, although if runs are related to factors
that tighten international financial markets, then this term also should be analyzed
as an optimal portfolio decision.
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captures the relative frequency of jumps and sudden stops; as this rises,
the price of the insurance rises. The third is the difference between the
probability of a jump conditional on a sudden stop taking and not taking
place. The latter term captures the risky asset’s ability to transfer
resources to the states where they are needed the most.
Dividing φ by x isolates the share of the risky asset in the component
of reserves used for hedging sudden stops. This is the concept we
emphasize henceforth by setting x = 1 (or K = 0).
3. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
This section takes the analysis one step closer to actual assets. We
start by specifying a state variable, st, that is correlated with sudden
stops but is not under the country’s control. Assume that st evolves
according to the following discretized stochastic differential equation:
() ( ) 11 0,1 tt t ss s t N t d J + −= μ Δ + σ Δ + ε ,  (9)
where μ(st) is the drift (that is, the mean appreciation rate of the state
variable) and σ is the volatility. The most interesting part of this expression
is the jump process, dJ1, which is zero except at date 1, when it takes
the value one with probability η and zero otherwise, in perfect analogy to
the setup in the last section. We let ε be a normally distributed random
variable, with mean με > 0 and standard deviation σε.
3.1 Call Options
Given the above framework, we develop a simple strategy that
can create an asset of the sort envisaged in section 2.3 by writing
contracts contingent on st. To do this, we take the continuous time
limit of equation (9) and consider a contract with an investment bank
or insurer in which the central bank pays an amount, κdt, in exchange
for each dollar received if st exhibits a jump at t = 1. Such a contract
is well defined in continuous time. In reality, we can approximate it
by signing a sequence of appropriate (sufficiently out-of-the-money)
digital options that cost ηdt per unit of time. Such options can also be
well approximated by regular puts and calls. The cost of such a position
over the full period is
1
0 dt η= η ∫ ,
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and the payoff is one if a jump happens at t = 1, and zero otherwise.
This strategy is also feasible if one extends the model to the case in
which a jump in st can happen at any time τ, as in Caballero and
Panageas (2005). This is the process we estimate in the empirical section.
In conclusion, this sequence of short term digital options is, for all
practical purposes, identical to the contract described in section 2.3.4
3.2 Futures Contracts
We now consider simple futures contracts. If investors are risk
neutral with respect to st risk, a futures contract on st with maturity
at t = 1 can be entered into at a forward price of
Es 1 () ,
with return
sE s s 11 0 − () .
The expected payoff of such a position at t = 1 is approximately5
  ∼ vN J N − ( )+ () ( ) ημ σ μ σ εε ε ,, 1 ,
where 1(J) corresponds to an indicator function that takes the value of
one when a jump in the state variable takes place, and zero otherwise.
Futures have a price of zero. To keep the analysis comparable with
the results obtained in section 2.3, however, we consider a slight variation
of a futures contract and assume that the country must pay ημε upfront
for every contract into which it enters in exchange for a payoff of
vN J N ∼ 01 ,, σμ σ εε () + () ( ).
The solution to the maximization problem of equation (1) in this case is thus
πμ
ψψ
ση ση μ η
η





















− − () ψ
l ;
BK Z 0 =+ − ψπ η μ ε .
4. See Caballero and Panageas (2005) for a more extensive discussion of
these issues.
5. A continuous time model is necessary to make the argument in this
section exact.
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Several observations about π are worth highlighting. First, we can
set με = 1 without loss of generality, since the dollar amount invested in
the risky asset is πμε at a price of η per dollar invested. Moreover, the
right-hand side depends only on the ratios (σ/με) and (σε/με). Hence from


















Comparing equations (10) and (7) shows that the amount invested
in risky assets declines when one moves from digital options on the
jump to simple futures (that is, the denominator is larger in equation









ση σ η ε  , (11)
which declines as  σ and  σε increase. This is intuitive: the more noise
contained in the hedging opportunities, the less appealing they become
to a risk-averse central bank. The portfolio φ is also attenuated by the
ratio in equation (11).
To summarize, sudden stops must be severe to justify adding a
risky asset to the central bank’s holdings, and the risky asset must be
sufficiently correlated with such events. On the other hand, neither
causality nor the predictability of sudden stops and returns are part of
the argument for a non-zero π.
4. QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT
The theoretical argument for hedging is difficult to dispute. The
relevant question is thus an empirical one: do some global financial
instruments and indices offer good enough hedging opportunities against
sudden stops? The answer to this question is largely country specific,
as not all emerging market economies are exposed to the same sources
of fragility. In this section, rather than performing a collection of case
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studies, we show that at least one global asset has significant correlation
with emerging market crises. In the absence of better country-specific
alternatives, this global asset should constitute a significant share of
these countries’ portfolios.
4.1 The Basics: Sudden Stops and Jumps
We study a group of nine emerging market economies open to
international capital markets in the 1990s, for which we have complete
data: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico,
Thailand, and Turkey.6 These economies are representative of what is
often referred to as emerging market economies. Our main exclusion is
the group of Eastern and Central European economies, which became
significant participants in international capital markets in the second
half of the 1990s. These countries, however, faced economic problems
of a somewhat different nature during much of our sample.
The first point to highlight is the well known fact that private capital
flows to these economies comove significantly. Figure 1 splits into two
panels the paths of the change in capital flows—more precisely, the
difference between contiguous four-quarter moving averages of quarterly
capital flows—to each of these economies from 1992 to 2002. The shaded
areas mark the periods corresponding to the systemic tequila crisis,
Asian crisis, and Russian crisis, as well as the sequence of somewhat
less systemic Turkish, Argentine, and Brazilian crises. The figure
demonstrates that these flows correlate significantly, especially within
regions. Turkey is somewhere in between the two regions. These
comovements are encouraging, as they indicate the possibility of finding
global factors correlated with sudden stops.
The second, and main, point is that clearly identifiable global
factors—in fact, traded factors—are correlated with emerging market
sudden stops. The key to finding such factors is that these episodes
are generally understood as times when investors are reluctant to
participate in risky markets. The VIX precisely captures this
reluctance, and it has been available in the United States since 1986.
This is an index of the implied volatilities from puts and calls (typically
eight) on the S&P 100.7 Figure 2 reproduces the shaded areas for
6. The exception is Malaysia, for which we do not have quarterly capital flows.
7. Implied volatilities are determined using the Black and Scholes (1973)
formula to calculate the level of volatility that would be compatible with the observed
prices of puts and calls.
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Figure 1. Capital Flows for Varius Countriesa
A. Capital flows for Latin American countries
B. Capital flows for East Asian countries and Turkey
Source: International Financial Statistics (IFS).
a. The figure depicts the difference between four-quarter averages of capital flows and the same quantity one
year before. The shaded areas depict periods of major crises).
sudden stops described in the previous graph and plots the daily VIX.
Some of the largest jumps in the VIX occur precisely during sudden
stops. In fact, the only systemic sudden stop that does not coincide
with a jump is the tequila crisis, when the rise in the VIX was not
large enough to count as a distinct jump.
399-420 A IMPRIMIR.pmd 02/03/2006, 10:58 410411 Contingent Reserves Management: An Applied Framework
Figure 2. Daily VIX Seriesa
Source: Chicago Board of Options Exchange (CBOE).
a. The shaded areas depict the periods of major crises.
The next section formally documents the joint behavior of sudden
stops and jumps in the VIX. First, however, we explore the behavior of
the VIX during the two largest systemic crises of the 1990s (namely,
the Asian and Russian crises). The top panel in figure 3 plots the path
of the VIX during the last two weeks of October 1997 (that is, the onset
of the Asian Crisis), while the bottom panel does the same for August–
September 1998 (the peak of the Russian long-term capital management
crisis). In these events, the VIX reached levels above 30 and 45 percent,
respectively, which are close to the maximum levels of the index. The
VIX doubled in a matter of days.
Finally, figure 4 reinforces the message of high correlation by plotting
the path of the VIX together with J.P. Morgan’s Emerging Market
Bond Index (EMBI) for three of the most fragile emerging markets in
recent years: Argentina, Brazil, and Turkey. The dips in the EMBIs
correspond with the sharp rises in the VIX.8 The VIX—a variable that
is primarily meant to capture the “feelings” of investors in U.S. equity
markets—thus happens to be highly correlated with the fortunes of
emerging market economies. This highlights another important aspect
of our methodology, according to which the only requirement for a
variable like the VIX to be useful in hedging is that there also be a
change in the conditional probability of having a crisis in emerging
markets. This is not a statement about causation, but about correlation.
8. The EMBI data are from Datastream. Note that the Argentine (permanent)
crash also coincides with a spike in the VIX.
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We are not claiming that domestic factors do not play a paramount
role in crises. Quite the contrary, we chose Argentina, Brazil, and
Turkey for the previous figure precisely because their own domestic
weaknesses make them more responsive to global factors. This
compounding effect often raises, rather than dampens, the need for
hedging global risk factors.
4.2 Quantification
We now turn to a structural analysis of the correlations highlighted
above.
Figure 3. Plots of the VIX in the Weeks Surrounding Major
Crises in International Financial Markets
A. Daily VIX during the Asian crisis
B. VIX Daily during the Russian crisis
Source: Chicago Board of Options Exchange (CBOE).
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Estimation of the VIX process
To operationalize the model of the previous section, we take log(VIX)
to be the state variable, st, which follows the continuous time process,
ds s y dt dB dJ tt t t =− ( )− ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦ ++ θσ ε log .
This is the continuous time limit of equation (9), with the modification
that jumps can happen at any point in time.9 The functional form,
μθ ss y tt ( )=− ( )− ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦ log ,
corresponds to a first-order autoregressive, or AR(1), process in discrete
time for log(st). We thus start by estimating an AR(1) process for log(VIX)
with monthly data and focus on the residuals, v, which are distributed
(for small Δt) roughly as
vp N t t p N ∼ 1− () − ( )+ ( ) ημ σ μ σ εε ε ΔΔ ,, .
Figure 4. The VIX and the EMBI for Argentina, Brazil,
and Turkey
Sources: CBOE and Datastream.
9. This is not a serious departure if the horizon in the decision model is
understood to be one year and the probability of more than one jump taking place
in a single year is small.
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Given the very few observations with jumps, we identify these directly
by inspection; this process fixes η = 0.417 and hence p = 1 – e–ηΔt. The
rest of the parameters are estimated by maximum likelihood of the
mixing of two normal distributions, with the following results: με = 0.356;
σ = 0.353; and σε = 0.047.
The likelihood of sudden stops
The results in the previous section suggest the presence of seven
jumps in the VIX in our sample: the first Persian Gulf War, the
Asian crisis, the Russian crisis, the terrorist attacks on the United
States (9/11), the Turkish crisis, the Brazilian crisis, and the
corporate scandals in the United States. Conditional on these jumps,
we calculate the probability that a country will experience a sudden
stop. We identify an observation as a sudden stop based on a mixture
of information on capital flow reversals and reserve losses (see
Caballero and Panageas, 2005). Mainly, for an observation to count
as a sudden stop, capital flows must decline by at least 5 percent of
gross domestic product (GDP) relative to the flows in the previous
two years, and reserves must be declining. This procedure yields
estimates of ψh and ψl for each country. We then estimate ψ from
the relation
( ) 1
hl ψ=η ψ + −ηψ .
The results are reported in Table 1. The country-specific estimates
are highly imprecise, however, as they correspond to the product of
binary variables with very few transitions in each case.10 We therefore
pool the observations, which yields the results for the sample average.
We also report results for two subcategories: high-risk economies
(Argentina, Brazil, and Turkey) and the East-Asian economies. The
former group is composed of the economies that have the highest
estimated likelihood of a sudden stop in the sample.
10. The case of Mexico is particularly revealing. The estimate of ψh = 0 misses
the fact that while Mexico did not experience a very significant capital flow reversal
during the Russian/LTCM/Brazilean turmoil, its stock market declined very sharply,
reflecting that it experienced significant pressure at the time, but adjusted primarily
via prices instead of quantities. Chile and the East Asian countries have a ψl = 0
because we identify only a single SS for each of them and we observe a jump in the
VIX during the same period.
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Table 1. Estimates for ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ, ψ ψ ψ ψ ψh, and ψ ψ ψ ψ ψl
Country or group ψψ h ψl
Argentina 0.42 0.80 0.14
Brazil 0.42 0.60 0.29
Chile 0.17 0.40 0.00
Indonesia 0.17 0.40 0.00
Korea 0.08 0.20 0.00
Malaysia 0.25 0.40 0.14
Mexico 0.17 0.00 0.29
Thailand 0.17 0.40 0.00
Turkey 0.33 0.60 0.14
Average 0.24 0.41 0.11
High-risk countries 0.39 0.67 0.19
East Asia 0.17 0.35 0.04
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. ψh is estimated as the number of years in which we observe a joint jump in the VIX and a sudden stop in the
country, divided by the number of jumps in the VIX. Symmetrically, ψl is the ratio of the number of years in which
a sudden stop was not accompanied by jump, divided in the total number of years without a jump. To determine
whether a sudden stop and a jump coincide, we allow for a two-quarter window around the date of the identified
jump, because jumps are identified at a higher frequency than sudden stops. With the estimates for η, ψl, and ψh
in hand, we obtain the estimate for ψ presented in the first column of the table.
The pooled estimate indicates that an average emerging market
economy is nearly four times more likely to experience a crisis when
the VIX has jumped than when it has not. Again, this is not a
statement of causation, but of correlation. When the VIX spikes, the
average emerging market economy has a 41 percent chance of
experiencing a sudden stop. This chance drops to 11 percent when
the VIX is tranquil.
Representative VIX portfolios and reserves gains
We use the above numbers to operationalize formulas 8 and 11 and
thus estimate the portfolios implied by the model. Again, country-specific
numbers are very imprecise, so attention should be placed on the pooled
results. Table 2 reports the portfolios.
The values of φ are large. The futures contracts show shares of
risky assets of 10 percent or higher for the different groupings, despite
the large amount of noise in the VIX. When the call-options strategy is
followed and hence the “noise” is removed, the shares rise to above 50
percent in all cases, and to nearly 80 percent for the Asian economies.
The share is high among East Asian economies because in the sample,
they experience mainly systemic crises (again, this is not a causal
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statement); this contrasts with the high-risk economies, which also
experience idiosyncratic crises.11
These portfolios are dramatically different from those normally held
by central banks in emerging markets. Finding out why seems
imperative. Is it the potential markets’ lack of liquidity, domestic political
constraints, or simple institutional herding?
5. THE BENEFITS
Our reduced-form portfolio model is not well suited for a thorough
welfare comparison. In assessing the benefits of the hedging strategy,
we thus focus on statistics that are robust across preferences. In
particular, we report the expected gains conditional on the occurrence
of a sudden stop. We illustrate this for the call-options scenario.
The first step in computing this statistic is to estimate the likelihood
of a jump given that the country has experienced a sudden stop. Using
Bayes’ rule yields





11. Note also that the difference between the optimal precautionary behavior
of a high risk and an average economy is not only reflected in the different values
for φ, but also on the level of reserves held. Recall that R0 = K + ψZ.
Table 2. Representative Portfolios for Options and Futures











High-risk countries 0.51 0.10
East Asia 0.79 0.16
Source: Authors’ calculations.
399-420 A IMPRIMIR.pmd 02/03/2006, 11:40 416417 Contingent Reserves Management: An Applied Framework
Table 3 reports the estimates, which are around 70 percent for an
average emerging market economy and close to 90 percent for the
relatively stable East Asian economies. This is important. The VIX jumps
with a high likelihood at times when the countries need it to do so.
The rate of return for the call strategy is











hh ⎡⎤ ⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ηη
φ ψ −−− ψ ⎢⎥ ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ψη ψ ⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎣⎦
.
Table 3 also reports these results. For an average economy, the
expected gain is around 40 percent. That is, an average economy following
the strategy described here can expect a 40 percent rise in its reserves
on entering a sudden stop.12 This is a significant number, which exceeds
the actual reserve losses of many of these economies during their
respective sudden stops.
Table 3. Revised Probabilities and Expected Gains When
Following the Options Strategy











High-risk Countries 0.71 0.36
East Asia 0.88 0.86
Source: Authors’ calculations.
12. The counterpart of this expected gain during sudden stops is that the
economy may expect to lose 13 percent of its reserves when there is no sudden stop.
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Many caveats can be raised here, and they are likely to reduce
these large numbers. For example, in a dynamic model, the central
bank might find it optimal to hold a level of reserves above a certain
minimum in all contingencies, even in good states. In the present model,
this is equivalent to assuming that the central bank targets a nonzero
level of reserves (that is, K > 0), which implies that x < 1. As shown in
expression 8, the portfolio of risky assets is scaled down proportionally
with x. Alternatively, one could imagine a situation in which a central
bank wishes under no circumstances to lose more than c percent of its
reserves, in which case the optimal portfolio would become
() min , c φ .
Notwithstanding these caveats, the above calculations make a simple
point: no matter which assumptions we make about preferences and
constraints, the driving force behind our results is the strong correlation
between the VIX index and the incidence of sudden stops. The simple
quadratic framework that we propose is particularly well suited to
making this separation between preferences (which solely affect x) and
correlation explicit. While a more elaborate model like that in Caballero
and Panageas (2005) is required to develop a satisfactory theory for x,
the effects that come from the strong correlations are independent of
the specifics of the model.
6. FINAL REMARKS
We start our conclusion with a disclaimer. The portfolios we
illustrate for the emerging market economies we study, and our
emphasis on the VIX, are neither country-specific nor instrument-specific
recommendations. Our goal is simply to illustrate the potential benefits
of enriching the portfolio options of central banks and searching for
assets and indices that are global in nature but correlated with capital
flow reversals.
Within this limited goal, our results are promising: the expected
gains in reserves during sudden stops can be significant (slightly less
than 40 percent of reserves for an average country). This is noteworthy,
considering that we are only considering a single risky asset which is
not optimized to capture the risks faced by emerging market economies.
The latter point raises an issue of international financial
architecture. The VIX is useful because it is correlated with implied
volatilities and risks in emerging markets, but it also captures
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problems that are specific to the United States. Ideally, one would
want an index that weights U.S. events that are likely to have
worldwide systemic effects differently from those that are not. It should
be relatively easy to construct implied volatility indices that isolate
the former factors and still preserve the country-exogeneity properties
of the VIX. Constructing such indices is important for creating
benchmarks and developing liquid hedging markets for economies
exposed to capital flow volatility.
An issue that we avoided entirely is the incentive effects that a
modified central banks’ policy of hedging external shocks may have on
the private sector. This is an important concern, since the private sector
may undo some of the external insurance in anticipation of a central
bank’s intervention. The hedging policy should probably be coordinated
with monetary and regulatory policies (see Caballero and
Krishnamurthy, 2003). Even in the absence of these complementary
policies, however, perverse incentive effects are unlikely to be strong
enough to fully offset the justification for more aggressive hedging
practices. After all, current reserve policies also suffer from these
problems and are justified on the grounds that many in the private
sector are simply not forward-looking enough to hedge aggregate risks
in sufficient amount.
If such practices were to be adopted collectively, we would soon
observe the emergence of new instruments that better match the needs
of emerging market economies. The welfare improvement from such
enhancements could be very significant and therefore may justify a
coordination role by the international financial institutions and central
banks around the world. Such coordination may be a necessity for
limiting the potential political costs from hedging losses.
To conclude, we reiterate that our emphasis on external sources of
capital flow volatility does not seek to shift the blame for much of capital
flow volatility away from the countries themselves. Our goal is simply
to show that a significant component can be hedged. Moreover, the
issue we highlight here interacts with the domestic sources of external
fragility: weak countries are more likely than strong countries to be
hit by global turmoil, and they should therefore put an even bigger
effort into hedging against these global shocks.
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